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were no clear legal guidelines for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights. Those rights were generally known to arise from the precolonial presence of Aboriginal societies in Canada and their occupation of lands but, prior to 1996, the Court had not laid down any rules for determining which practices and traditions qualified for protection as Aboriginal rights and which did not. This matter became particularly important when Aboriginal rights were accorded constitutional protection (along with treaty rights, which will not be discussed in this paper) at the same time as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was introduced in 1982. This protection was provided by section 35( 1 ) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."' The intention was to identify and define Aboriginal rights by political means and, possibly, by further constitutional amendment. But even though four constitutional conferences were held in the 1980s to accomplish this task, the talks foundered over the issue of Aboriginal self-government. As a result, identification and definition of Aboriginal rights were relegated to the legal forum of the courts by default. 2 The Supreme Court first considered the effect of the constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights in the Sparrow case, decided in 1990.3 In that case the right in question-the right of the Musqueam Nation in British Columbia to fish for food, societal, and ceremonial purposes-was accepted by the Court without the need to formulate a test for identification of Aboriginal rights generally. The Court focused instead on the issues of extinguishment and infringement of Aboriginal rights, holding that the rights constitutionalized in 1982 are those that were "existing" in the sense that they had not previously been extinguished by clear and plain legislation or treaty. The Court nonetheless decided that the constitutional protection provided in 1982 is not absolute-Aboriginal rights can still be infringed by legislation if the government can establish a valid legislative objective for the infringement that is substantial and compelling, and show that the government's fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal people in question have been respected by consulting with them, infringing their rights as little as possible in the circumstances, and paying them compensation for any expropriation. This has become known as the Spurrow justification test.
As Spurrow left open the issue of how Aboriginal rights are to be identified and defined, the Supreme Court was obliged to return to this question in 1996 in the Van der Peet, Gladstone, and N. ' We will focus our discussion on the Van der Peet case, as it laid down the test for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights that was applied in the other two decisions. That case involved charges laid against Dorothy Van der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo Nation in British Columbia, for unlawfully selling ten salmon that had been caught under the authority of an Indian food fish license. In defense, she claimed an Aboriginal right to sell fish.
The Chief Justice of Canada at the time, Antonio Lamer, wrote the majority judgment. In it, he created a test for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights that is commonly referred to as the "integral to the distinctive culture" test. In Lamer's words, "in order to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right."5 Moreover, the time for determining whether a practice, custom, or tradition meets this test is the time prior to contact between the Aboriginal people in question and the European colonizers. Practices, customs, and traditions that arose as a result of contact do not qualify, as in Lamer's view they are not "aboriginal." In the case at hand, although the Sto:lo had traded with other Aboriginal nations and exchanged fish for other goods prior to European contact, Lamer found that exchange of salmon for money or other goods had not been an integral part of their distinctive culture. Dorothy Van der Peet therefore did not have an Aboriginal right to sell salmon, even in small quantities, as exchange of salmon had not been a defining feature of precontact Sto:lo society. Instead, it was incidental to the more primary activity of fishing for food and ceremonial purposes, and so was not sufficiently integral to their distinctive culture to be protected as an Aboriginal right.
Lamer's narrow, time-orientated approach to the identification and definition of Aboriginal rights has been severely criticized. The two women on the Supreme Court at the time, Justices McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dubk, both wrote strong dissenting judgments. While accepting Lamer's statement of the appropriate test quoted above, McLachlin disagreed with the meaning he attached to "integral." For her, a practice is integral to an Aboriginal culture if it "is part of the unity of practices which together make up that culture. This suggests a very broad definition: anything which can be said to be part of the aboriginal culture would qualify as an aboriginal right protected by the Constitution Act, 1982."6 She also thought that Lamer's approach was too categorical, leading to an all-or-nothing result, and incorporated indeterminate subjective ele-
ments in identifying what is distinctive and central to a culture. She preferred an "empirical historic approach" that would allow judges to identify Aboriginal rights by asking: "Is this like the sort of thing which the law has recognized [as an Aboriginal right] in the past Y7 Her goals seem to have been to avoid rigidity, and to ensure that Aboriginal peoples, in keeping with their traditions and cultures, continue to have access to the resources necessary to sustain their distinctive societies. In keeping with these goals, she also rejected Lamer's precontact time frame for identifying Aboriginal rights, suggesting instead that they should be based on traditional Aboriginal laws and customs whose roots, while historical, need not be traced to precontact times.
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 was even more forceful in her dissent in Van der Peet. She characterized Chief Justice Lamer's precontact requirement as a "frozen right" approach that is inconsistent with Aboriginal perspectives, arbitrary, and unfair because it places an overly onerous burden of proof on the Aboriginal peoples. She preferred a "dynamic right" approach that would allow for the evolution of Aboriginal rights over time so they would "maintain contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of the natives as their practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the overall society in which they live.'" As long as a practice, custom, or tradition was sufficiently fundamental to the Aboriginal culture in question "jim a substantial c o n t i n m period of tim"-which she suggested could range from twenty to fifty years-it would qualify for protection as an Aboriginal right? L'Heureux-Dub6 also criticized Lamer's narrow approach to the definition of Aboriginal rights. Instead of focusing on particular Aboriginal practices, traditions, and customs, as he did, she favored a generic approach that would define Aboriginal rights in a more general and abstract way. She wrote: "the aboriginal practices, traditions and customs which form the core of the lives of native people and which provide them with a way and means of living as an organized society will fall within the scope of the constitutional protection unders.35( l).'"O Moreover, she viewed section 35( 1) more broadly as protecting the distinctive cultures of the Aboriginal peoples rather than particular activities that are "manifestations" of those cultures: "Simply put, the emphasis would be on the signijicmce of these activities to natives rather than on the activities themselves."" It was unclear from the Van der Peer decision whether Lamer's "integral to the distinctive culture" test would be applied to Aboriginal title to land. Commentators feared that it would, as the Chief Justice had written in his majority judgment that "aboriginal title is the aspect of aborigi- Lamer, who wrote the principal judgment, did not accept either of these positions. In addition to being inalienable, he found that Aboriginal title differs from fee simple ownership in a number of significant respects. First, it has its source in occupation of land prior to assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown, whereas fee simple title arises afterwards. Secondly, Aboriginal title has an inherent limit that prevents the land from being used in ways that are inconsistent with the attachment to the land that gave rise to it in the first place. Finally, Aboriginal title is a collective right that is held communally by all the members of an Aboriginal nation. Because of these distinctive features, Aboriginal title is unlike any other common law property interest-it is sui generis. Chief Justice Lamer nonetheless came down on the side of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en on the vital issue of natural resources. Despite Aboriginal title's special features, he said that it is "the right to the land itself," which "encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures."1Y He went on to hold specifically that Aboriginal title includes minerals, oil, and gas, even though exploitation of those resources might not have been a traditional use of the land. So the Van dpr Peet test does not apply to restrict the uses Aboriginal peoples may make of their lands, though Lamer did say that the connection with the land upon which Aboriginal title is based has to be "of central significance to their distinctive culture".20 He hastened to add, however, that this need not be an explicit element of the test for Aboriginal title, as occupation of land and maintenance of a substantial connection with it would be sufficient in and of themselves to show that an Aboriginal nation's relationship with the land was integral to its distinctive culture.
This brings us to the matter of proof of Aboriginal title. Lamer said Also, he found the date of sovereignty to be more certain.
Though Lamer spoke of Crown "assertion" of sovereignty, he must have meant "acquisition," as that is when the Crown's underlying title to lands would vest. But it is unclear whether he intended to limit this to acquisition of sovereignty by the British Crown, or meant to include the French Crown as well. In parts of Eastern Canada, the difference between these two dates could be as much as 150 years, during which time considerable movement of Aboriginal populations, and hence changes in occupation of lands, took place. Also, in many areas of Canada the date of acquisition of European sovereignty is at least as uncertain as the date of contact, as sovereignty involves murky legal questions as well as factual ones. Even more fundamentally, it might be asked why the onus is on Aboriginal peoples to prove their own title as against the European colonizers when we all know that they were here occupying lands when the newcomers arrived. In addition to defining Aboriginal title and explaining how it can be proven, in Delgarnuukw Chief Justice Lamer resolved an important issue concerning the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments. Under Canada's original 1867 Constitution, the federal government was given exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians."23 However, it was unclear whether "Lands reserved" included Aboriginal title lands, or were limited to lands expressly We have seen that Lamer described Aboriginal title as "the right to the land itself' and "the right to exclusive use and o~c u p a t i o n . "~~ These descriptive phrases clearly reveal that, despite its sui g e m ' s features, Aboriginal The Pamajewn decision has been criticized for, among other things, taking a narrow, fragmented approach to Aboriginal self-government. The Chief Justice refused to characterize the claim as being to "a broad right to manage the use of their reserve lands," as the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations wanted the Court to do.*" That, Lamer said, would "cast the Court's inquiry at a level of excessive generality."'O He demanded greater specificity, thereby obliging Aboriginal peoples to prove their right of selfgovernment on a piecemeal basis, activity by activity. Any possibility of establishing a broad right of self-government over their lands and peoples appeared to have been foreclosed by this decision.
Sixteen months later, the Supreme Court decided Delgamuukw. As we have seen, it declined to deal with self-government then. But Chief
cant Aboriginal-rights decision t o date, the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw finally recognized that Aboriginal title to land includes a right to exclusive use and occupation that encompasses natural resources. Given the extent of unsettled Aboriginal title claims, especially in the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, and British Columbia, the economic and political implications of this ruling are enormous. The issue of Aboriginal Self-government has also been simmering ever since the constitutional conferences of the 1980s, but outside of agreements such as those reached with the Inuit of Nunavut and the Nisga'a in British Columbia, it remains unresolved. Given, however, that a right of self-government probably underlies every other Aboriginal right, acknowledgement of its existence by the Supreme Court cannot be far off.
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